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THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATURAL LAW AND
COVENANT THOUGHT AS SOURCES FOR PUBLIC
THEOLOGY
RonaldJ. Wrightt
I. INTRODUCTION
Christian thought has long played a significant role in the shaping of
American political institutions. In seeking to promote a public theology that
draws upon these Christian resources for addressing contemporary American
culture, one that is marked by religious and cultural pluralism, the natural law
and covenant traditions have much to contribute. These two traditions are
particularly appropriate in the American context as both were instrumental in
shaping the United States' unique political landscape.' The Declaration of
Independence is evidence of the hybrid nature of natural law and covenant
thought that was present at the time of the American founding and upon which
major institutions were created. By drawing upon self-evident truths known to
all people of reason and by appealing to "nature and nature's God," the
Declaration makes intentional and overt use of natural law concepts. Covenant
is also a prominent feature of the Declaration as several covenantal elements are
found within it, including the representative nature of government personally
expressed through signatures and the appeal to God to witness and judge.
Natural law and covenant both make use of the principles of consent of the
people as a foundation of government, the rule of law, and the protection of
civil rights, which run throughout the Declaration. As indicated by historian
t M.Div, Asbury Theological Seminary; J.D., State University of New York, University
at Buffalo, School of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Loyola University Chicago.
1. As for the contributions of the covenant tradition, see DOCUMENTS OF POLITICAL
FOUNDATION WRITTEN BY COLONIAL AMERICANS: FROM COVENANT TO CONSTITUTION (Donald
Lutz ed., 1986), analyzing the covenantal aspects of early American foundational documents.
See also DANIEL ELAzAR, COVENANT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1998), providing an in-depth treatment of the use of covenant in political
thought. Elazar defines covenant as "a morally informed agreement or pact based upon
voluntary consent and mutual oaths or promises, witnessed by the relevant higher authority,
between peoples or parties having independent though not necessarily equal status, that provides
for joint action or obligation to achieve defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under
conditions of mutual respect which protect the individual integrities of all the parties to it." Id.
at8.
As for the natural law tradition, particularly in its American political context, the thought of
Catholic public theologian John Courtney Murray, S.J., has been informative. See JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
PROPOSmON (1960).
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Benjamin Wright, the founders combined natural law insights with those of
Puritan covenantalism and common law elements found in British and
American jurisprudence to form a generalized higher law model that served as a
standard by which human laws could be judged.2
By retrieving the helpful concepts within the natural law and covenant
traditions, these two currents of theopolitical thought can serve as a guide in
present day discussions on the place of moral knowledge in political and legal
debate. This paper argues that natural law and covenant thought can continue
to make important contributions by revitalizing the religious and moral
dimensions of public life. In addition, this paper argues that the natural law and
covenant traditions may be used to produce a moral consensus in society, while
also limiting government authority from excessive interference in the moral
sphere from undue infringement on legitimate freedoms. In the process, natural
law and covenant thought provide a means of balancing individual liberty and
communal responsibilities.
While there are many versions of natural law thought, the version used
herein reflects the teleological natural law found in Thomist tradition. In the
discussion of natural law in the American context, the writings of Jesuit
theologian John Courtney Murray are used as a guide. He describes four
premises of natural law which are that:
natural law supposes a realist epistemology, that asserts the real to
be the measure of knowledge, and also asserts the possibility of
intelligence reaching the real . . . . Secondly, it supposes a
metaphysic of nature, especially the idea that nature is a teleologic
concept.., that there is a natural inclination in man to become what
in nature and destination he is. . . . Thirdly, it supposes a natural
theology, asserting that there is a God, Who is the eternal Reason,
Nous, at the summit of the order of being, Who is the author of all
nature, and Who wills that the order of nature be fulfilled in all its
purposes, as these are inherent in the nature found in the order.
Finally, it supposes a morality, especially the principle that for man,
a rational being, the order of nature is not an order of necessity, to
be fulfilled blindly, but an order of reason and therefore of
freedom.3
The covenant tradition as used herein represents the theological and political
aspects of public thought that developed out of the Reformed traditions that
2. Concerning the influence of natural law in the Revolutionary era, see BENJAMIN F.
WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 8-11,88-90,327-29 (1962).
3. MuRRAY, supra note 1, at 293-94.
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were particularly influential in colonial New England. A defining element of
the covenant tradition is that political relationships are based on agreements,
tacit or explicit, among groups of people. The concept of covenant also extends
to the inner structures of groups, whether they be families, churches, trade
organizations, or political bodies. Covenantal groups are marked by voluntary
participation, defined rights and responsibilities of membership, commitment to
group goals and patterns of governance, and holding leaders responsible to their
obligations. Another feature of covenant thought is its emphasis on the division
of powers within and among levels of government. In addition, covenant
communities are subject to dynamic change over time that necessitates political
and social structures that can accommodate revision. Finally, the covenant
tradition in its theological and political aspects acknowledges a moral aspect to
life to which the community is oriented and toward which it strives.
The natural law and covenant traditions contain elements that continue to be
helpful in discussing the role that religious and moral thought play in modem
democracies that are marked by religious pluralism. From a Christian
perspective, these traditions provide support for the modem democratic state
and the inclusion of religious and moral perspectives in policy formulation and
debate. As developed below, this paper will describe some of the contributions
that these traditions can continue to make in understanding the role of religious
thought in the public sphere by discussing: 1) the development of moral belief
and action across a diverse range of voluntary associations; 2) the place of state
action in the moral sphere; and 3) and personal liberty within a context of moral
regulation in society.
II. ASSOCIATIONS AND MORAL FORMATION
A common strength of the natural law and covenant traditions is their view
of humans as social beings that live in a complex society made up of any
interrelated institutions, spheres of activity and associations. Among natural
law writers, John Courtney Murray has emphasized the concept of subsidiarity
and role of community associations in preserving a public space for moral
development outside of the jurisdiction of the state. In addressing the principle
of subsidiarity, Murray states:
It asserts the organic character of the state-the right to existence
and autonomous functioning of various sub-political groups, which
unite in the organic unity of the state without losing their own
identity or suffering infringement of their own ends or having their
functions assumed by the state .... This principle is likewise the
assertion of the fact that the freedom of the individual is secured at
2008]
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the interior of institutions intermediate between himself and the state
(e.g., trade unions) or beyond the state (the church).4
The importance of associations also has been a current in covenant thought and
was thoroughly explored in the thought of Johannes Althusius in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.5 By conceiving the public arena as a
matrix of multi-tiered forums that range in levels of complexity, public action
need not simply be thought of as the passage of laws by the state. This
emphasis on the associational aspects of social and political involvement at the
intermediate levels of society highlights several elements that are important in
both the natural law and covenant traditions. First, the covenant thought
tradition holds that God has vested political power and action in the people.
Second, covenant thought places importance on the role of personal
relationships and responsibility to one another as a driving motivation for
action. Third, covenant thought also allows people great range of flexibility
and innovation in forming new groups to address changing concerns.
The emphasis on the intermediate levels of political life is not meant to
eliminate consideration of the individual or broader levels of society that deal
with statewide and national issues. It does, however, indicate that the primary
means by which the individual person interacts with others on matters of wider
concern are through the mediation of intermediate organizations. This reflects
the reality that a group of people acting in concert has greater strength than
individuals acting separately.
Political power may be used for good and bad purposes, which was one of
the reasons why the architects of the American republic sought to limit the
power of factions.6 The primary method for doing so was in the concept that a
large republic would have so many diverse groups that no one of them would
gain so much power as to constitute a threat to the whole.7 Across a wide
republic, factions would have to work together in order to build a consensus to
achieve their goals. Yet without some overarching principles that serve to
guide and illuminate debate, the political process can simply become a battle
between competing groups utilizing instrumental power. Because of this
danger, the need to develop civic virtue through a process of moral formation is
an important part of the covenant and natural law traditions that complements
the role of associations in public life. Where the government lacks the
4. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 334.
5. JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, THE POLITICS OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS: AN ABRIDGED
TRANSLATION OF THE 3RD ED. OF POLMCA METHODICE DIGESTA, ATQuE EXEMPUS SACRIS ET
PROFANIS ILLUSTRATA (Frederick Carney trans. & ed., 1964).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
7. Id.
[Vol. 2:969
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competency to promote a moral vision, it depends on the vitality of public
associations to implement this in the populace. Otherwise, the moral consensus
by which a society depends for its stability and growth exists simply in the
coincidence of many private moral judgments.8
A. Covenant Thought
As public but non-governmental groups, voluntary associations can serve as
the means by which discussions of moral and religious values enter into
discussions of public policy. Not all groups can serve in this capacity as
communities possessing some element of shared moral vision, however.
Otherwise, groups would simply be lifestyle enclaves where people gather to
pursue their own individual interests among others of like mind. Yet when
properly constituted, the associative institutions of civil society can and should
be the places where moral values are developed and conveyed.
Principles of religious freedom must be respected in a nation where different
conceptions of the good and ultimate reality exist. In the absence of religious
freedom, the majority's views can simply be imposed upon others in tyrannical
fashion that is the antithesis of democratic ideals. The covenant and natural law
traditions, while having their difficulties with the concept of religious freedom,
have also been used to promote its importance by figures such as Roger
Williams and John Courtney Murray. The covenant and natural law traditions,
while having their difficulties with the concept of religious freedom, have also
been used to promote its importance. To promote freedom, the institutions that
shape moral formation and belief, primarily the church, should be kept separate
from the institutions of the state, whose primary purpose is to enact laws for the
public good. As expressed by Murray, natural law promotes human dignity and
freedom of conscience while limiting the competency of the state to act
concerning religious matters.9
Laws, however, will necessarily incorporate the beliefs of the people in terms
of policy goals, priorities, and implementation. Indeed, it is almost impossible
to conceive of a law that does not incorporate multiple levels of moral meaning
and practice. Even mundane laws concerning speed limits involve public
policies with corresponding moral values and priorities with respect to
sometimes conflicting concerns of public safety, individual liberty,
environmental welfare and economic policy, to name but a few. While the state
8. MURRAY,supra note 1, at 214-15.
9. For the use of natural law ideals to promote religious liberty, see John Courtney
Murray, The Human Right to Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES
wrI PLURALISM 241 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1993).
2008)
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must never act to coerce religious or moral beliefs on the people, the state
cannot but reflect these beliefs in terms of the types of laws that it passes, the
social goals it seeks for its people, its domestic and foreign policy choices, and
the means by which it seeks to implement these disparate policy goals.
While there may be no single overriding solution as to how moral belief can
be integrated into public discourse in a manner that respects the multiplicity of
views about morality in a pluralistic society, the natural law and covenant
traditions offer an approach that seeks to balance the maintenance of a
communal moral vision with an openness toward diversity and innovation. The
natural law and covenant traditions both embrace a notion of objective morality
that can be known and that is relevant in public policy formation. This reflects
the Christian commitment to the transcendent nature of moral truth that is
rooted in the creative action of God in establishing the universe. Laws obtain
their force and validity by conforming to this objective moral order that places
all aspects of society, including the state, under the rule of law. As indicated in
the Preface to the Laws andLiberties of Massachusetts of1 647, the authority of
civil law was derived from dependence on both revelation and natural law. The
preface states:
The distinction that is put between the Laws of God and the laws
of men, becomes a snare to many as it is misapplied in the ordering
of their obedience to civil Authority; for when the Authority is of
God and that in way of an Ordinance,' 0 and when the administration
of it is according to the deductions, and rules gathered from the
word of God, and the clear light of nature in civil nations, surely
there is no human law that tends to common good (according to
those principles) but the same is mediately a law of God, and that in
way of an Ordinance which all are to submit unto and that for
conscience sake."
As the passage indicates, moral knowledge is accessible to all on some level
through the light of nature and this permits a discussion of morality across
practically all moral traditions. In Puritan New England, the covenant tradition
was more particular in its understanding of moral knowledge. While there may
be some natural knowledge of morality that is available to all, the primary point
of access to the objective moral order is through God's self-revelation in
10. See Romans 13.
11. Increase Nowel, Preface to the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 1647, in DONALD
LuTz, DocuMENTs OF POLmcAL FOUNDATION BY COLONIAL AMERICANS 260 (1986) (internal
citations omitted).
[Vol. 2:969
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covenant with particular peoples in history. 12 While covenant thought sees the
moral insights of scripture as being consistent with that known from human
reason, scripture has the benefits of being more exact, trustworthy and clear.'
3
The use of scripture as the moral source for law was not problematic in the
Puritan Christian commonwealths of New England. In that region at the time,
there was a uniform religious belief and commitment to Biblical revelation.
Even the rest of America did not find the moral use of the Bible as a basis of
law problematic until well into the middle of the twentieth century.' 4 In
modem day, however, using scripture or religious understanding as a basis for
formulating laws and policy becomes far more problematic under conditions of
widespread diversity in moral thought.
Utilizing aspects of covenant and natural law together can help address some
of the concerns involved in incorporating moral discussions across
communities. The covenant concept that a people are formed as a political
body based on a common moral understanding of themselves with obligations
that are owed to one another provides a starting point. As noted by Donald
Lutz, covenants seek to bind people into community under the witness of a
higher power and in the process define the type of people they aspire to be.1
5
Each succeeding generation has the opportunity to accept the same covenanted
principles or to seek innovation by adopting new or refined moral
understandings.
A number of moral sources inform the dynamic processes by which societal
moral formation occurs. In a pluralist society, it can be expected that different
communities will develop their moral understandings in accordance with their
own traditions, values and methods. Those that utilize scripture as a significant
source of moral knowledge would continue to do so in the development of their
beliefs, while those that favor other approaches such as through scientific
methods and insights would continue to utilize those sources as well. While a
Christian public theology may ideally hope for a state of affairs in which all
people embrace the Christian worldview, such a public theology ignores the
effects of sin and is unduly triumphalistic. Utilizing the categorization of
12. See Letter from John Cotton to Lord Say, in 12 NEw ENGLAND WAY, LIBRARY OF
AMERICAN PURITAN WRmTNGS: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 414-15 (Sacvan Bercovitch ed.,
1984).
13. Id.
14. RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 34-35
(1996).
15. See Donald Lutz, The Evolution of Covenant Form and Content as the Basis for Early
American Political Culture, in COVENANT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 35 (Daniel Elazar ed.,
1994).
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pluralism made by evangelical philosopher Richard Mouw and Dutch
philosopher Sander Griffioen, a Christian public theology should avoid
normative directional pluralism, which sees the proliferation of competing
visions of ultimate reality and moral meaning as a positive good to be sought,
but should instead accept such pluralism descriptively as a reality until Christ
returns. 16 Natural law plays an important part in this process as it serves as the
basis for utilizing moral language in public discourse. Once the existence of an
objective moral standard is accepted as legitimate and as something that all
societal groups, including the state, are under an obligation to obey, then public
discourse over the content of law can follow. Rather than merely seeking to
advance a group interest or implement political strategies based on power,
resource mobilization and procedural tactics, substantive moral discussions
would have a legitimate part in the political processes. In developing laws and
policies, people of varying ideologies can attempt to determine what the law's
requirements for a just society involve. As Murray suggests, this is not a
process of simple majority rule, but a process by which principles and standards
are sustained through public persuasion through appeals to the collective
experiences and reflective thoughts of the people. 7
B. Levels of Government
For the American polity, the highest and broadest level of agreement are the
generally recognized legal principles codified in the Constitution. Also at this
broadest level of agreement are the unwritten moral principles that form the
basis of societal attitudes on a broad range of subjects. Often the presence of
this unstated consensus only becomes apparent in times of change when this
prevailing status quo is challenged. For example, an unspoken and widespread
consensus regarding the status of marriage as being between that of man and
woman only became an issue to be stated and defended as the concept became
challenged.
At the local and associational levels, disagreements and differing policies
may exist as communities come to different understandings of the moral
commitments that are required of them. The multi-leveled structure of society
envisioned by the natural law and covenant traditions permits complexity in the
passage of laws based on the different moral commitments of various
communities and locales.
16. See RICHARD Mouw & SANDER GRIFFoEN, PLURALISM AND HoRizoNs: AN ESSAY IN
CHIUSTIAN PUBLIc PHILoSOPHY 16-19 (1993).
17. MuRRAY, supra note 1, at 105-07.
[Vol. 2:969
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Even given the variety of governmental and policy visions that are present in
American political culture, limits still exist concerning the degree of moral
disagreement that may be permitted. Society must maintain allegiance to the
basic principles underlying a general national covenant, and even those who
seek societal change. Dissenting speech can be given wide latitude, but this
does not always translate into permissible political action, except for those
practices that reflect a commitment to values which society as a whole has
decided to protect, such as individual expression or the free exercise of religion.
Further, such dissent need not require nor imply a moral anarchy or relativism
if there is an underlying commitment to the objective reality of moral truth that
all people seek to understand. For example, dissent in the form of civil
disobedience can serve to promote the moral order where the laws that are
disputed are seen as being in violation of the natural law. Thus, Martin Luther
King, Jr., could appeal to the natural law in support of his civil disobedience
against segregation.18
Sometimes, in fact, those who dissent from the community's description of
this reality can be seen as attempting to promote a better understanding of true
morality. These dissenters serve sometimes to shake the community out of an
easy acceptance of prevailing norms that do not genuinely represent its core
values. Moral reestablishment in this sense serves as a valid basis for the sort
of civil disobedience that acts as a witness to higher natural law principles that
society ought to accept. Dissent that simply advocates dissonant thought
without a nexus to the larger moral discussion of a society places itself outside
of the social fabric that makes up the political community. Likewise dissent
that seeks to remove morality from consideration altogether undermines the
foundation upon which the community is built and thereby places itself outside
the bounds and protections of the law.
Given the directional pluralism that exists within societies that possess
different views about ultimate reality and truth, the concept of a national
covenant is less useful. A society that has made a national covenant with God
as a party, such as existed in Puritan New England, is prone to abuse power,
and suffer from the effects of presuming a special relationship between
themselves and God. As an alternative political concept, covenant can instead
be seen as the means by which people voluntarily organize into communities
and governments under the principles of a higher law. The insights of natural
law principles can be incorporated by viewing this higher law as knowable and
capable of acceptance by all on some level.
18. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 293-94 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986).
2008]
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In this process, specific peoples can agree to particular formulations of what
this law entails by making use of their knowledge learned in their communities
in light of social aspects of moral understanding developed under both natural
law and covenant thought. This well developed moral lore is the basis for
specific covenants within different groups, and this moral lore can serve as
starting points for dialogue with others that are outside of the particular
community. The sense of commonality that the natural law brings helps to
provide an impetus for seeking the common good across communities.
In the covenant approach, moral formation occurs within communities that
have come together in recognition of an accepted moral tradition. The most
prominent are the moral communities that have developed around scripture in
the case of Jewish and Christian traditions. Nonetheless, other societies outside
of the Jewish and Christian contexts have also developed covenant models of
government and have a common moral tradition that the society uses to guide
its decision making processes. 19 In any of these local communities, the moral
outlook is basically homogeneous and the laws of society are based on their
common heritage with the application of shared moral wisdom to the legislative
process being relatively uncontroversial. While there may be discussion as to
what course the covenant community should take or what specific legislation
best serves the purposes of the community, the overall direction, aims and goals
of the community are set.
Even where there is agreement internally, those outside of the community
who do not accept its moral foundations may not find the community's
reasoning convincing. It may be that the outsider would come to the same
policy conclusion albeit on different grounds. In a communitarian model where
groups look only to internal moral resources, there is little basis to adjudicate
between competing communities and each is left as an island of moral authority
unto itself. These communities may either withdraw from the larger political
process to tend to their own concerns or may join with other communities to
accomplish some specific political tasks without entering into dialogue as to the
reasons behind their policy positions. However, by integrating natural law and
covenant concepts into an approach that incorporates the social dimension of
moral life, a communitarian model can be developed that allows for interaction
across community boundaries.
19. Concerning historical examples of the development of covenant societies including
those in Switzerland, among the Norse and Celtic cultures and among Native North American
cultures, see 3 DANIEL ELAZAR, COVENANT AND CONsTrUTONAusM: THE GREAT FRONTIER AND
THE MATRIX OF FEDERAL DEMOCRACY, THE COVENANT TRADITION IN POLITICS 269-70 (1998).
[Vol. 2:969
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C. Interaction Between Communities
Natural law provides a moral language that can span different moral
communities as it is based on a common human nature knowable by all. 20 In
both the covenant and natural law traditions, people are viewed as social beings
who come together to form societies to promote their own flourishing, by
seeking the common good or by entering into groups.2' In its most abstract
forms, natural law thought is not as useful in bridging particular moral
communities because it looks only to what can be accepted in terms of reason
alone apart from specific social and historical circumstances. Anything that
cannot be discussed in terms of a purely rational analysis would be improper in
public policy formation. This type of moral analysis lacks the rich substantive
content that underlies particular moral communities.
Much contemporary reflection on natural law seeks to develop an approach
grounded in historical and social context and thereby escape an overly
rationalistic and abstractionist approach to moral reasoning.22 At the same time,
covenant thought can be used to push beyond a narrowly circumscribed moral
community to enter into dialogue with others. Both traditions can utilize an
interpersonal approach as each places great emphasis on human relationality.
This enables a model of moral discourse based on mutual dialogue that
references one's own community but does so in awareness of a broader horizon.
In The Responsible Self, H. Richard Niebuhr provides a description of this
dialogue, which illustrates how society may bring the communitarian aspects of
covenant and the cultural transcendence of natural law together. He states:
A democratic patriot in the United States, for instance, will carry
on his dialogue with current companions, but as one who is also in
relation to what his companions refer to representatives of the
community such as Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, LincoIns,
etc. Responsive to his companions he is also responsive to a
transcendent reference group and thereby achieves a relative
independence from his immediate associates. Insofar he has become
not only a responsive but also an accountable self. But now the
20. See Francisco Sudrez, On Laws, bk. ii, ch vii, para. 5, in 2 SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J. 211 (Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown & John Waldron
trans. & eds., 1944) [hereinafter SELECTIONS FROM SUAREZ]. See generally ALEXANDER P.
D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHiOsOPHrY 22 (2002).
21. See ALTHusluS, supra note 5, at 12; Suirez, On Laws, bk. iii, ch. ii, para. 4, in
SELECTIONS FROM SUAREZ, supra note 20, at 375-76.
22. See, e.g., LISA CAHILL, SEX, GENDER AND CHRISTIAN ETmIcs: NEW STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN
ETHICS SERIES (1996); DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2002).
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transcendent reference group-these founding fathers, for instance,
encountered in memory and these representatives of the community
in a later time encountered in anticipation-refer beyond
themselves. They are persons who stand for something and
represent something. They represent not the community only but
what the community stands for. Ultimately we arrive in the case of
democracy at a community which refers beyond itself to humanity
and which in doing so seems to envisage not only representatives of
the human community as such but a universal society and a
universal generalized other, Nature and Natures's God.23
Communities exist in a tension, ideally a creative one, between the particular
realities of their historical existence and the transcendent order that reaches
beyond the community to others and eventually to God. As Brazilian legal
scholar Roberto Unger observes, this tension cannot be fully resolved as a gap
will always exist between mundane particularity and universal transcendence.24
This gap reflects the reality that moral knowledge and political actions are
imperfect.25 In the process of looking beyond itself toward shared values
belonging to common humanity, communities participate in natural law
dynamics in seeking those fitting responses that relate a particular view of one
limited community to the larger view of a more extensive human community. It
also resonates with elements of Reformed thought that attempt to distinguish
between the true virtue of the elect community and the natural virtue found in
the world.26
As communities enter into discussion and form relational bonds, areas of
common understanding can be used in forming agreement. While the moral
languages utilized in the dialogue may be different, the concepts are portable,
even if not all the richness of the original is captured. As Harvard theologian
Ronald Thiemann observes, "disagreement requires some common premises or
else the contending positions would simply 'talk past one another' rather than
engage in true conflict., 27 In the process, communities may learn that multiple
expressions exist that promote common moral truths, which would have
otherwise gone unseen. At the same time, discernment is required to prevent
syncretism that blends incompatible elements of other cultures into a
community's moral language. One of the dangers of utilizing abstract
23. H. RiCHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 85 (1963).
24. See ROBERTO UNGAR, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 256 (1975).
25. Id.
26. See JONATHAN EDWARDS, THENATURE OF TRuE VIRTuE (Univ. of Michigan Press 1960)
(1765).
27. THIEMANN, supra note 14, at 107.
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categories of reason in this process is that a priori categories may be imposed
on varied cultural understandings rather than seeking common understanding in
the midst of difference.
28
Natural law provides a sound foundational approach for seeking moral
agreement across cultural and ideological divides. At the same time, the
structural aspects of covenant thought provide a platform for lawmaking across
communities based on increasingly complex interactions. While moral
communities can develop significant policy positions on a number of issues in
reliance on their internal belief systems, they must also develop resources for
explaining and permitting cross-cultural moral agreement with others in a way
that fosters further discussion and growth.
From the Christian perspective, the combination of natural law and covenant
thought provides a basis for internal community formation, for communication
and dialogue across a number of communities, and for grounding moral
agreement with others from different moral perspectives. Additionally, it is not
required that the others with whom one is interacting share the same moral
basis for reaching moral agreements, either internally or transculturally, so long
as they possess some internal basis for doing so. As Catholic theologian David
Hollenbach suggests, societies need an "intellectual solidarity" that regards
differences among traditions as a stimulus to reflection and engagement
regardless of cultural or religious boundaries.29 In practical terms, different
communities, and even different nations, can seek moral understandings of
higher natural law principles, as those principles become known in actual
historical situations. Within a nation, this consensus can guide policy
formation. At the broadest level, societies can draft specific context-driven
treaties on shared understandings, thereby building a legal basis for governing
international relations on a wide range of issues.
It should not be expected that agreements on all issues will be reached as real
differences exist across moral communities. A natural law covenant framework
for public theology allows for development of greater common understanding
over time on a range of issues without forcing a false conformity. In the
process, the acceptance of difference and the establishment of legitimate non-
exclusionary boundaries that are essential to the maintenance of true
community life are permitted.
28. Lisa Sowle Cahill notes cross-cultural misunderstandings that arise when Western
values are automatically assumed to be universals in her analysis of natural law and feminism.
She notes the difficulties in promoting literacy in some third world situations without
understanding how it would be valued in context. See CAHLL, supra note 22, at 58.
29. For his discussion of intellectual solidarity, see HOLLENBACH, supra note 22, at 138.
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III. STATE ACTION IN THE MORAL SPHERE
The distinctions that exist in civil society between intermediate level
associations and the state permit limits to be placed on government action in the
moral sphere. While political communities ordered on covenant principles like
Puritan New England often sought to control all moral aspects of life with
enforcement by the state, this need not be the case. As articulated by John
Courtney Murray, the natural law influenced concept of jurisdiction only
permits laws regulating morality when the public welfare of society as a whole
is involved and where such constraint promotes human freedom.3° Murray
states:
Therefore the moral aspirations of the law are minimal. Law seeks
to establish and maintain only that minimum of actualized morality
that is necessary for the healthy functioning of the social order. It
does not look to what is morally desirable, or attempt to remove
every moral taint from the atmosphere of society. It enforces only
what is minimally acceptable, and in this sense socially necessary.
31
In this analysis, broad areas of private interests are respected that are not
subject to state control. These areas, however, are not simply left to individual
judgment. They are matters of public concern due to their implications to wider
society. The empowerment of intermediate level organizations to take a more
active role in the lives of community members serves as the primary means of
social moral regulation for matters outside the jurisdiction of the state. This is
part of the spiritual mission of the church and describes what Murray referred to
as the freedom of the church that enables it to possess a free reign within larger
civil society.32
A. Private Covenantal Organizations
Even while acknowledging that many areas of moral life are not proper for
state action and lawmaking, many issues confront a political community which
involve an overlap of moral and legal considerations. Many of these areas are
controversial because they involve personal decisions and privacy interests that
make legislation appear to be inappropriate meddling. Even so, legislation may
be advisable where personal decisions have broad ranging consequences that
impact society as a whole.
Marriage can serve as an example to analyze the complex set of issues
30. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 160-65.
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id. at 201.
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surrounding attempts to circumscribe state intrusion in the private sphere.
Marriage is the most intimate and personal relationship entered into by two
people, yet it also serves important public purposes in achieving a measure of
social and economic stability for the marital partners, their children, their
extended family and the community surrounding the marriage. The
strengthening of marital relationships through appropriate laws serves a public
purpose beyond the purely personal and contractual aspects of the institution by
promoting social stability. 33 Accordingly, marriage has long been subject to the
laws and regulations of the state in the West since the time the state began
taking over jurisdiction of marriage from the canon law of the church.34
While some state regulation is acceptable, delineating areas that are proper
for legislation can be difficult and can change over time. Adultery was once
seen as a criminal offense because of the impact it had on marriage and the
surrounding community. In modem times, however, adultery is now seen as a
private moral problem, not an issue of criminal law. Nonetheless, adultery can
still be subject to legal consequences in divorce proceedings, although this too
can vary depending on the jurisdiction.35 Conversely, battery within marriage
was once seen as a private domestic problem but is now subject to increased
public scrutiny and criminalization.36 It is evident in the realm of marriage that
the state retains some measure of authority over matters that could be
considered either moral failings or crimes depending on one's perspective.
Under the view that civil society is made up of various associations that have
their own proper function, the creation and maintenance of public moral
standards as it relates to marriage belongs to church and family institutions.
Given the need for some state regulation in the area of marriage and divorce,
however, it is proper for the state to respond to the concerns raised by churches,
families and other appropriate organizations. The state may either strengthen or
weaken how factors such as adultery are considered in divorce to reflect
ongoing public concerns and values in this area. This is not an improper
intrusion of the state into private affairs, but rather a reflection of the need for
the state to be attuned to the social impacts of moral decisions on community
33. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?: A Change in Culture for the
Sake of the Children, 46 LA. BAR J. 116 (1998).
34. Concerning the history of state regulation of marriage, see JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM
SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE WEsTERN RELIGION 53, 217
(1997).
35. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J.
773 (1996); Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Lawson Adultery-A Synopsis, I J. FAM. L. 89 (1961).
36. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993).
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integrity. ,1
Arguably, it could even be appropriate for adultery to be subject to criminal
sanctions if the public views adultery as sufficiently detrimental to the public
good. However, other prudential factors, such as the ability to enforce anti-
adultery laws, would have to be considered before any such laws were enacted.
In order for an anti-adultery law to be enforceable, the moral position animating
it would have to be received as true and beneficial by a sufficiently large
consensus of the people that most would seek to follow the law and to see
others compelled to obey as well. Nonetheless, given the inherent problem of
enforcement in actual practice, limiting state involvement to the self-policing
process of divorce and family court proceedings would be advisable as a matter
of prudential policy. In this regard, the natural law tradition has long included
prudential factors in its consideration of the lawmaking process.3 7
Whatever position that state adopts with respect to adultery, the state is
taking a moral stance so that neutrality with respect to adultery is not possible.
The state either must view adultery as benign, and therefore leave adultery
unregulated, or view adultery negatively, and therefore attach legal
consequences to the act. A position regarding the social order is present in
either situation, and it is the function of the state to reflect the vision that has
been worked out in the public sphere by the different intermediate
organizations that promote diverse and conflicting views of the public good as
its relates to marriage.
The same process can be implemented in examining the legality of same-sex
marriage. While it may not be advisable to seek government involvement in the
criminalization of purely personal sexual decisions given the issues surrounding
effective enforcement and privacy, the state must still have some involvement
in the determination of the legality of same-sex marriage given its necessary
regulative role. This is another area where neutrality is not a possibility, as
competing conceptions of societal good and the role that marriage necessarily
pull against one another in the public sphere.
According to modem views that largely prevail in most jurisdictions,
marriage is a purely contractual relationship between two individuals. This
contractual relationship is created and dissolved by the decisions of those two
individuals under the authority of the state. Accordingly, the overarching moral
interest is the preservation of liberty and equality against unjust encroachment
37. For example, Aquinas cautioned that "a human law should never be altered, unless the
gain to the common well-being on one head makes up for what has been lost on another."
Prudential balancing to promote the common good was a hallmark of the legislative process.
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II q. 97, a. 2 (Benziger Bros. ed., 1947) (1274),
available at http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP.html.
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on individual rights. In other concepts of marriage that retain some connections
with religious and social institutions, marriage has a greater social context. In
these views, marriage involves more than the decision of the two partners and
extends to their children or potential children, their other family members, the
community in which they live, and the various social and business
organizations which interact with the family unit.
Under this view, there is adequate basis for a marriage to comply with
certain basic community standards that have been worked out in the public
social and moral spheres. The laws of most states reflect some combination of
these two views. Citizens of the various jurisdictions are at liberty to select
their marriage partners, subject to state scrutiny on grounds of incest, bigamy,
age and mental capacity.
Where the state has authority for regulating marriage, its laws will generally
draw from prevailing community beliefs concerning its societal meaning and
role. These regulations are not neutral but reflect a certain expectation about
the function marriage plays in society. The moral ramifications of marriage are
thus evaluated within this broader social perspective, which may emphasize
either the social or the individual aspects of marriage. Under a contract model,
same-sex marriage could be permitted as a protected liberty interest. Same-sex
marriage could also be permitted under natural law and covenant views to the
extent that the larger community finds that it promotes the common good of the
whole. In this process, personal liberty interests are but one factor that is
considered along with other varied and competing societal concerns.
A public theology drawing upon the natural law and covenant traditions
allows for the consideration of a number of factors, including morality, but does
not require certain outcomes in what policies are actually enacted. The
determination of proper actions is left to the deliberative processes available in
civil society, which when appropriate, are then enacted in the lawmaking
institutions of the state. For instance, arguments based in natural law and
covenant thought have been used by both supporters and critics of same-sex
38
marriage.
A natural law and covenant based approach would permit the community to
weigh a number of factors in determining whether same-sex marriage should be
permitted. This should not be seen as a complete disavowal of modem
approaches to marriage that emphasize the contractual aspects of individual
choice. Great benefits have accrued to women in terms of becoming equal
partners in marriage with full property and personal rights to be free from
38. See generally ERic MOUNT, JR., COVENANT, COMMUNrrY, AND THE COMMON GOOD: AN
INTERPRETATION OF CHIusnAN ETHIcs 65, 155 (1999).
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physical, emotional, and sexual abuse which had previously been seen as being
immune from state regulation.39 While many of these rights were advocated by
social activists working out of, and motivated by, a Christian worldview, the
contributions of Enlightenment philosophies with their emphasis on individual
autonomy were also a significant force for change. 40 Natural law and covenant
thought looks to consider the free choices of the individual in the context of
responsible interpersonal relationships and the consequent associations that
make up the social matrix of larger civil society. In doing so, the common good
of the people, as a whole and as individually considered, is the goal of social
policy in legislation.
The difficulties in attempting to resolve controversial public policy issues on
morally neutral grounds are exemplified in recent court cases dealing with
same-sex marriage. As was indicated in the discussion above, laws regarding
marriage reflect societal values and judicial opinions tend to reflect these
differing conceptions. While neutral grounds based solely in legal reasoning
are often sought in judicial decisions, significant moral positions are
unavoidably taken when the courts consider for themselves fundamental rights
on a substantive basis. In the debate surrounding same-sex marriage, these
background moral beliefs include not just the nature of marriage and
homosexuality but also the overall place of moral values in public policy
debates.
Using New York as an example, the issue of same-sex marriage was taken
up in the case of Hernandez v. Robles, which serves to highlight many of the
problems with adjudicating issues of substantive moral rights in court
proceedings.41 The plurality opinion upheld the validity of New York laws
restricting same-sex marriage by determining that the New York Legislature has
a rational basis to define marriage as the union of opposite sex partners.42 This
use of rational basis centers on the argument that one purpose of marriage is to
promote the welfare of children and that it is reasonable for people to believe
that opposite sex marriage serves this purpose better than same-sex marriage.
The court reasons that while this may be controversial and is not accepted by
all, it is not an irrational position to take in light of a common sense premise
39. Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L. J. 1359
(1983).
40. See Mary C. Segers, Feminism, Liberalism and Catholicism, in FEMINIST ETHIcs AND
THE CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION, READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY 586 (Charles E. Curran,
Margeret A. Farley & Richard A. McCormick eds., 1996); see also DONALD W. DAYTON,
DISCOVERING AN EVANGELICAL HERITAGE 85 (1976).
41. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
42. Id. at 6 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW arts. 2-3).
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that children will do best with both a mother and a father in the home.43 This
reference to common sense is as close as the plurality comes to acknowledging
the validity of deferring to the public's sense of morality and whether this
satisfies the rational criteria required of judicial decisions. Indeed, the court
accepts the position that if the restrictions on marriage were wholly irrational
and based on ignorance and prejudice against homosexuals, then the measures
would be found unconstitutional.
In reaching its decision, the plurality is silent as to whether restrictions based
on firmly held moral beliefs rooted in religious traditions would count in the
category of rational or in the category of ignorance and prejudice. The dissent
holds no such qualms and places moral beliefs squarely in the realm of
irrationality, permissible for private belief but never for public policy.44 In
doing so, the dissent assumes that statements about ultimate reality are
impermissibly irrational in formulating public policy. However, this is itself an
assertion about the nature of ultimate reality for which the dissent makes an
apparent exception.
Judicial decisions are often determined based on how rights are
conceptualized and described. There is much fluidity and freedom in this
process of description that has significant ramifications, which further serves to
indicate the inadequacy of the judicial forum in the resolution of important
issues of public policy. The plurality in Hernandez defines the right at issue as
the right to marry a person of the same-sex, which they did not see as rising to
the level of a fundamental liberty right.45 As a result, the legislature could
properly restrict the practice without facing strict scrutiny. The dissent sees the
issue as the right to marry in itself, which is a fundamental liberty right that
may not be infringed upon by the state in the absence of a compelling interest.
46
While the dissent sees the restriction of same-sex marriage as subject to strict
scrutiny analysis, it also sees the restriction as failing to pass a rational review
basis.47 As indicated above, the plurality found that a rational basis exists for
the legislation in contrast to the dissent.48 In doing so, the respective opinions
demonstrate a difference in how rationality itself is being perceived by the
judges. The case shows how the legal reasoning utilized by both the plurality
and dissent largely misses or ignores the truly central issues at stake. Both sides
look to the existence of morally neutral reasons on the part of the legislature for
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id. at 30-31.
48. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6-8.
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banning same-sex marriages. The plurality sees the existence of such grounds,
while the dissent finds the reasoning to be a mask for the real basis of the
prohibition, the moral disapproval of the legislative majority which is nothing
more than prejudice.49 This position relies on the assumption that moral belief
is private, irrational and out of place in public policy decisions. An approach
based on natural law and covenant concepts seeks to demonstrate that this need
not be the case and that moral beliefs can play a role in shaping public policy
decisions in a manner that respects both individual and community interests.
Under this approach, legislative policies could incorporate moral views as part
of rational deliberation which would be factored into subsequent judicial
analysis and would not be perceived as a priori irrational.
IV. PERSONAL LIBERTY AND MORAL REGULATION IN SOCIETY
The above discussion highlights another important issue about the
relationship between personal liberty in making moral decisions and unjust
government encroachment into areas that are protected civil liberties. As has
been suggested, not all areas of sexual relations are matters of public concern
and should be left to the normal controls of social behavior that a society uses
outside of the legal context. Yet the natural law and covenant models also
recognize that there are some aspects to sexual behavior that the state does have
a responsibility to regulate when the public welfare is sufficiently impacted.
While no hard and fast rule of thumb exists that can demarcate what is proper
and what is not ahead of time, an approach that utilizes the insights of natural
law and covenant thought can provide some guidance.
Some areas of civil liberty, such as the freedoms of religion,50 assembly,51
and speech 52 are protected under the United States Constitution, which
expresses American society's understanding of the requirements of the higher
law. These areas should not be subject to government action absent a new
social agreement in terms of the amendment process because they reflect the
core beliefs of the people as to how liberty ought to be exercised where
personal rights and social responsibilities coexist. Indeed, political philosopher
John Rawls goes as far as to argue that these rights are so basic and
fundamental that not even later generations could alter them through
amendments, even though this would seem to privilege the moral insights of a
49. Id. at 32-33.
50. U.S CONST. amend. I.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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single era.5
3
As the basic moral agreement among the people is a living tradition, it can
be expected to change and evolve over time, and it is in fact necessary for it to
do so to remain vital and maintain the allegiance of the people. While many
minor changes in attitudes and beliefs are easily accommodated under the pre-
existing framework of laws and informal cultural beliefs, others require
significant changes in governing structures and involve debate at the
constitutional level. For instance, as the equality and rights of women came to
be recognized, the suffrage movement sought and obtained the right to vote.
54
The transition was not instantaneous nor easily achieved, but it did reflect the
changing moral attitudes of society with respect to gender equality.5
In terms of policies that carry deep social significance or impact large
numbers of people, decision making processes must reflect an underlying
consensus of the people as a whole. It is the responsibility of community
leaders, both those who are part of elected government and those who are part
of the voluntary associations that comprise civil society, to help the people
reflect and choose wisely. This responsibility derives from the notion that the
people are the source of authority and that leaders receive and hold their
lawmaking power only in their representative capacity.56 It also reflects the
notion found in both natural law and covenant thought that each society charges
its leaders with the responsibility for enacting laws that comport with the higher
law that governs society. While hierarchical power schemes that impose a view
of morality on others are to be discouraged, the need for leadership and moral
vision is still significant.
In the process of developing public policies, leaders have to rely upon the
underlying consensus drawn from the moral beliefs of the people. This is part
of their obligation to ensure that all laws are subject to the higher law principles
that govern state and society. Because leaders have no inherent moral insights
that are greater than any other citizen, their duties require an ability to both
listen and persuade. Sometimes this may involve unpopular courses that are
later vindicated, such that a leader need not always follow the winds of public
53. See JoHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 239 (1993).
54. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex, Equality, Federalism
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002).
55. Id.
56. Aquinas explains the purpose of laws in terms of the common good and provides a basis
for the notion of consent of the people in the lawmaking process that is later taken up in greater
detail by scholastics like Francisco Suarez. Aquinas states, "The planning is the business of the
whole people or of their viceregent. Therefore to make law is the office of the entire people or
of the public personage who has care for them. For, as elsewhere, to plan for an end belongs to
the power matching that end." AQUINAS, supra note 37, at I-II, q. 90.
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opinion as it is a reflection on the abiding underlying consensus and not the
moment that is significant in setting public policy.
57
Nonetheless, an opportunity must be given for the people to ratify or reject
the policy after enough time for reflection has occurred. Those political or
moral policies which develop without any opportunity for ratification by the
people must be rejected as outside the proper limits of state authority. Where
little possibility exists for the people to be involved in the ratification of a
decision by a public official, it becomes more important for that official to
refrain from imposing his or her own moral beliefs into the determination of the
law and policy. Where the state action can be easily changed, the
corresponding possibility that beliefs will be imposed in ways that are contrary
to the public consensus is lessened.
Given the back and forth movement involved in social discussions of
morality, there must be flexibility when it comes to government action that
involves public moral standards. As almost every public policy carries some
moral significance, whether in terms of taxation, defense, environmental
regulation, or social programs, let alone more visibly moral issues like same-sex
marriage and abortion, this need to be responsive is of paramount importance.
An approach influenced by natural law and covenant thought places the
primary responsibility for moral formation in the larger public sphere of civil
society that is the most adaptable to developments in historical context and
moral understandings. Laws of the state may reflect these moral beliefs when
touching areas of public concern that properly belong to the jurisdiction of the
state. However, laws that simply reflect a religious or a moral position but do
not involve the public good are outside of the proper jurisdiction of the state.
For instance, laws banning a particular religious practice or subsidizing an
evangelical crusade with public funds would always be impermissible no matter
how much popular support they receive. Natural law principles of prudential
judgment concerning the proper scope of government action can be applied
throughout this process, but it is always in the context of the actual agreements
made by the people that reflect their moral understandings. In doing so, an
approach using natural law and covenant insights seeks to preserve the proper
57. As Catholic natural law theologian Jacques Maritain suggested concerning the duties of
the ruler in reflecting a deeper consensus,
It means on the other hand, being intent on what is deep and lasting, and most
really worthy of man, in the aspirations and psyche of the people. Thus it is that in
incurring the disfavor of the people a ruler can still act in communion with the
people, in the truest sense of this expression. And if he is a great ruler, he will
perhaps make that disfavor into a renewed and more profound trust.
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 137 (Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1998) (1951).
[Vol. 2:969
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 990 2007-2008
NATURAL LA WAND COVENANT THOUGHT
domain of civil freedom that belongs to the people from unjust intrusion while
at the same time not adopting a view of freedom that rejects moral
responsibilities to the larger society.
A natural law and covenant based framework also provides some guidance
for the institutional structuring of government. The need for diversity, the role
of intermediate organizations and the principle of empowering the people to
participate in the political structures of society support the use of the federal
structures. In this manner, some variation in laws is permitted to reflect
regional, if not local, understandings concerning which laws best promote the
common good in light of the higher law that circumscribes government action.
It further permits tiers of involvement allowing laws to be enacted and
implemented at an appropriate level to be effective pursuant to the principle of
subsidiarity. 58 The use of representative government encourages some sense of
the face-to-face communication and relationship that is needed to foster
community in larger populations, although this becomes more difficult as size
increases.
Division of power within government serves as another means of limiting the
power of the state from unjust encroachment on civil liberty in natural law and
covenant thought. Under this approach, the legislative representatives are
vested with the greatest authority since they are the most accountable to the
people. In terms of appeal to higher law principles, elected legislative
representatives have the most leeway in seeking to invoke and shape the public
consensus. These representatives can be expected to promote and enact laws
supported by their constituencies which will have moral aspects in many cases.
Further, they can be removed from office if they use their position to promote
laws with moral objectives that differ from the consensus that exists among the
people.
Elected executives can also invoke and seek to shape the underlying moral
consensus that stands behind the law as part of their duties as leaders in the
public square. While more removed from the people than representatives,
elected executives still seek office in a process that can reveal their moral and
religious beliefs concerning public values and can govern accordingly on those
issues properly within their jurisdiction as civil lawmakers. While executives
need to pay heed to the notions of prudential judgment and practicality that
govern all lawmaking processes, they also have a duty to provide a moral vision
for the people. This involves a careful balancing between adhering to the
existing consensus and pushing the community in new directions of growth
which may sometimes put the executive at odds with the electorate. Given the
58. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 334.
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extensive range of moral issues that holders of executive power regularly
confront, they will frequently have cause to consider the religious and moral
aspects of policy matters where those areas are properly within the scope of
their responsibilities in the political sphere.
Non-elected executive officials and the judiciary are the farthest removed
from direct accountability and therefore present the greatest risk of imposing
moral and religious beliefs upon the people in a manner contrary to society's
consensus. While these officials and judges may invoke their expertise to help
aid the discussion and development of moral consensus in civil society,
imposition of moral standards in an authoritative manner is not to be preferred
over inductive models of moral understanding developed in the covenant and
natural law approaches. Given the obstacles that exist in overturning policies
enacted by non-elected civil officials and judges because they cannot be easily
removed from office, retaining moral authority in the hands of the people is the
most effective basis for avoiding a displacement of the public consensus.
The judiciary retains its important function of keeping the institutions of the
state within their own proper sphere in civil society. Judges have the
responsibility to discern when ordinary legislation impermissibly imposes a
religious or philosophical system of belief or seeks to discriminate against
minority beliefs. This can be particularly difficult when these actions occur
under the guise of apparently neutral legislation. 59 Further, judges would be
called to evaluate whether laws directly regulate religious practices that are
beyond the powers of the state to enforce. While moral content may influence
legislation and public policy, the state lacks jurisdiction over the formulation of
beliefs concerning ultimate reality.
60
The importance of moral discourse within society is related to a concern for
the preservation of freedom throughout both the natural law and covenant
traditions. The recovery of a notion of a civil or covenant liberty that operates
in a context of responsibility to both oneself and others can be used to balance
an undue emphasis on natural liberty, which would overstress the significance
of individual autonomy.61 Covenant liberty does not consider individual
59. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (addressing the impact of apparently neutral controlled substance laws on Native
American religious practices); Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (same).
60. See Murray, supra note 9, at 237.
61. The concept of covenant or civil liberty in Puritan covenant thought is classically stated
by Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop. Winthrop defines this type of liberty as:
civil or federal. It may also be termed moral, in reference between that covenant
between God and man in the moral law, and the political covenants and
constitutions amongst men themselves. This liberty is the proper end and object of
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autonomy unimportant, but it does refuse to see the person in isolation of the
many relationships that bind a person to others. Likewise, the exercise of
freedom in natural law thought seeks for the attainment of moral excellence and
the cultivation of virtue in accordance with the moral law of God.62 The
differences between these competing notions of freedom for political
responsibility are succinctly stated by Lutheran theologian Robert Jensen as
follows:
On the one hand, freedom has meant for us what it meant for the
Greek and medieval free cities, for the towns and township
communities of the colonies, and for the governing class of the
colonial state authorities: access to the forum where the community
deliberates and decides its own good, participation in the polity.
Taken of the community as such, this freedom is then the
community's ability to conduct such deliberation itself. On the
other hand freedom has meant for us what it means in mechanistic
political theory: freedom from the community's deciding of the
good, the existence of a space where I, as we have come with great
accuracy to state it, can do my own thing. The two conceptions can
at best uneasily coexist, since the one calls me into the community
and the other calls me out of it.
63
Under the natural law and covenant approaches, freedom is always
understood in terms of a larger social framework that is subject to many
determinative influences.64 This is the tradition of viewing political liberty as
participation in the decision-making processes of the community where
freedom is exercised in light of one's moral obligations to others.65 These
commitments involve the person in the deliberations of the community as a
whole. Without this notion of interdependence, real freedom only exists in
those situations where one is isolated from others, and engagement with others
becomes the means by which personal liberty is eroded. The exercise of
authority and cannot subsist without it, and it is a liberty to that only which is
good, just, and honest.
JOHN WINTHROP, THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP 1630-49: ABRIDGED EDITION 282-83
(Richard S. Dean & Laetitia Yeandle eds., 1996).
62. See SERVAIS PINCKAERS, THE SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN ETHIcs 345 (Mary Thomas Noble
trans., 1995).
63. ROBERT JENSEN, AMERICA'S THEOLOGIAN: A RECOMMENDATION OF JONATHAN EDWARDS
154 (1988).
64. See PINCKAERS, supra note 62, at 354; see also JONATHAN EDWARDS, THE FREEDOM OF
THE WILL (Soli Deo Gloria Publications 1996) (1845).
65. See JENSEN, supra note 63, at 154.
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freedom in the name of community responsibility need not require the
affirmation of a single vision of ultimate truth by the citizens of a civil society,
as it is the cultivation of responsibility to temporal civil society and the interests
of citizens within this limited sphere that is the interest of the state. As such,
one of the important tasks of politics is to delineate the range and bounds of
freedom of a particular society.
In the natural law and covenant traditions, freedom becomes a means for
engagement with others rather than withdrawal for private pursuits. It
presupposes a realm of value in which different citizens and communities
interact with one another to contribute to the common good. In this view,
freedom is not primarily concerned with avoiding interference from others as
one seeks private goods and happiness, although this should not be interpreted
as denying the validity of individual freedom or private interest. Nonetheless,
these values are placed within an overall context that balances the interests of
the person against those of the community. Construing liberty in this relational
sense emphasizes public participation by citizens in ways that blur any clear-cut
demarcation between the private and public sectors. In doing so, it helps
promote a vision of the common good, which is the responsibility of all people
and not just the state.
V. CONCLUSION
When considered together, natural law and covenant thought provide a
framework that promotes the inclusion of moral belief in the development of
public policy. They do so by allowing for a matrix model of civil society that is
composed of different levels of personal and group involvement. Under this
framework, the state bears the responsibility for enacting laws for the common
good of all society, while moral development is left to the organizations
existing at the intermediate levels making up civil society. The state does not
exist in isolation from larger society and depends on it for the creation of values
that animate the policies it pursues.
A covenant and natural law framework also provides resources for
considering how moral formation occurs within a civil society marked
descriptively by directional pluralism and across the boundaries that divide civil
societies from each other. Through a commitment to transcendent order
existing independently of the particular community, dialogue with others can be
established to develop a consensus on matters of public policy. At the same
time, the approach provides resources for promoting diversity and preserving
civil liberties when confronted by overreaching by the state in the name of
preserving a common order.
The natural law and covenant traditions contribute to a public theology that
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provides resources for balancing individual liberty and autonomy with
community responsibility. In doing so, it permits moral considerations drawn
from competing ideas concerning ultimate reality to be utilized in developing
public policy. As political authority is vested in the people, moral discourse
begins with the broader elements of civil society outside of the state.
Correspondingly, when state involvement is warranted, those parts of
government in closest relationship to the people are most empowered with
lawmaking authority and with the ability to consider the moral values promoted
by legislation. While not requiring any specific outcomes, a public theology
utilizing covenant and natural law principles provides a method for permitting
public consideration of morality while still protecting the civil liberties of the
people.
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